On the other hand there is no doubt about the general perception that the Indian Army Forces had not really covered themselves with glory. The Tamil Tigers came out as almost legendary fighters. With their Cyanide culture, they became a romantic figure who were willing to fight to death to achieve their arms. They fought with a ferocity that laid to rest the doubts about the fighting capabilities of the Tamilians.

However, most of the students of geopolitics have failed to understand that The Indian Armed Forces entered Sri Lanka at the request of the Sri Lankan President, Mr. Jayewardene, and left Sri Lanka again, the moment the new incumbent Mr. Premadasa asked for its withdrawal. The pertinent point, which was made by Mr. Dixit, in his book, 'Assignment Colombo', stated that had the IPKF been given another six months, they would have completed their task. However, he goes on to add, the withdrawal was interpreted by considerable segments of Indian public opinion as a major failure in India's diplomacy and failure of the Indian Armed Forces, to fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to them.

The basic question is, however, why did India become involved in fighting another country's fight? What was the need to commit the Indian Armed Forces? Was it raw unadulterated ambition of the Indian leadership? Or was it a sign of Indian naivete? On the other hand, was there a genuine perception about Indian interests to be protected in that region? In that case, what were the Indian interests that were threatened? These questions need to be delved into to ensure that the Indian tax payer is not taken for a ride by the powers that be. At the same time it will, hopefully, also ensure that there is a clear cut perception of Indian interests that need to be protected.

There is also a need to examine the circumstances that led to the committing of the Indian Armed Forces in Sri Lanka. It must be realised that the Indian Army had to commit her Army Headquarters Reserves when she committed 54 Infantry Division. With the committing of the 36 Infantry Division, the Indian Army also denuded their strike formations of their major component. In other words, the Indian Army had virtually left the Western Gates to India unguarded. What made her take the risk, that till date had been considered unacceptable? Or is there truth in the allegations that the Indian Armed Forces are bloated and are much more than required?

Yet there is also no doubt that the Government's approach in this entire affair was extremely Byzantine. This was possibly the only instance, in the entire world history, where the Government of the country was waging a war, against its own instrument of policy, the Armed Forces. The Indian Peace Keeping Force had been tasked by the Government of India to disarm the Tamil Tigers, even while the latter was being funded, armed and trained by the Indian Government. The Government was also providing the Tamil Tigers safe haven for rest, recuperation and medical treatment.

It is not that the Indian Government alone was being devious. The Sri Lankan Government was being just as devious. Having given his commitments, Mr. Jayewardene went back time and again. It was also a well known fact that, while the President wanted one thing, at least he stated that, while his Prime Minister did something completely opposite. When cornered, dilatory tactics were resorted to, to scuttle the efforts being made in all sincerity. Of course, there were political constraints that, the Sri Lankan having created a Hydra, were now in an unenviable position of not being able to go far enough, to assuage the Tamil feeling of alienation, or their aspirations.

The end result is that, till today, the impasse continues. Sri Lanka continues to be in a state of Civil War. The positions is as follows:-

1. No meaning-full political dialogue, between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan Government appears to be in sight, even now, in 1998.

2. Emotional and psychological antagonism between the Tamils and the Buddhist Sinhalese has only increased, because of continuing war between the Tamil Tigers and the Government.

3. The Buddhist clergy are particularly averse to any agreement with the Tamils.

4. The Armed Forces have also assumed a dominant role in the political affairs of Sri Lanka. They have acquired this influence because they have become the mainstay of the Governmental authority, in the North and East Sri Lanka.

5. While the Sri Lankan Forces have made some very impressive gains, there are some very legitimate doubts about their capability to take these operations, to their logical conclusion, i.e., complete subjugation of the Tamils. Notwithstanding some very impressive victories, there is rampant desertion amongst the cadres of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces.

6. The Tamil Tigers in particular and the Tamils in general are showing a remarkable degree of resilience. Both the source of funds and the source of weapons, notwithstanding the American Government's declaration of the Tamil Tigers, as a terrorist organisation, are still intact. What is more important, notwithstanding the official announcement by the Government of India and the Government of Tamil Nadu, disclaiming any contacts with the Tamil Tigers, for the average Tamilian, in India, there is only admiration, for the way the Tamil Tigers are continuing to fight against odds, for the retention of the Tamil interests in Sri Lanka.

7. With India withdrawing from the scene, the Sri Lankan has established contacts with a number of foreign countries for assistance, in terms of funds and weaponry as well as training of their Armed Forces. This is bound to have an adverse effect on the Indian interests in that region.

8. The fallout of any adverse situation for the Sri Lanka Tamils is bound to rebound onto the Indian Tamils. Under the circumstances one wonders if Prabhakaran will renounce his demand for Tamil Eelam.

9. In the final analysis, the struggle in Sri Lanka is almost donning the look of an Armageddon, the end of which would be the utter destruction of society in Sri Lanka as we understand it.

There is no denying the fact that as a member of the South Asian Association For Regional Co-operation, there is a certain degree of obligation to help a member nation when its geo-political entity is threatened. However, this obligation has to be viewed with caution. It does not mean that Indian can, or should go, blundering into every member country, to prop up the existing regime. Indian cannot sacrifice the lives of her citizens, just for some nebulous idea of her regional interests. To that extent, there is a positive need for the Indian leadership, to first clearly spell out what are India's interests and thereafter work out her Policy.

When we analyse the Indian Policies in Sri Lanka one is struck by the utter contradiction in the different facets spelt out. For example Mani Dixit quotes what Rajiv Gandhi instructed him. He says, "While till 1985, India's Sri Lankan policy was influenced by Tamil Nadu Politics, and ethno-religious considerations, it would henceforth be "An Indian policy responsive to India's security and strategic interests and responsive to the principle of not disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of a small neighbour". He added that, within this over all framework, India's endeavour would be to ensure the maximum fulfilment of legitimate Tamil aspirations. In other words while sounding very noble, almost pompous, it was just a meaningless verbiage, with each clause contradicting the other. To that extent the allegations that the Indian Policy in Sri Lanka was devoid of any substance and was just hollow, appears to be quite to the point.

It is indeed unfortunate that Indian leadership has so far failed to perform this very basic responsibility. This in turn has led to complete ad hocism in her approach to geo-political requirements. To the extent that India has been accused of knee-jerk reactions to geo-political events. Towards that end this study, undertaken by the Strategic Research Centre will, hopefully, clear the air and also provide certain guidelines for working out India's interests.