Dr. Swaran Singh Ghauri: Pakistan's first IRBM

Ever since in 1987 Pakistan announced that it had obtained nuclear weapons "capability" of its own, the successive regimes in Islamabad have been busy developing delivery systems for their nuclear warheads which includes both the fighter bombers and missiles. And here, though it has obtained a certain number of F-16s and other multirole aircraft from China and the United States, it is really their acquisition of missiles that remain a complete mystery as well as the most potent threat as far as India's security is concerned.This partly comes from the fact that India, as yet, has not either developed or obtained any anti-ballistic missile systems which can counter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

This is also because Indian responses have been generally very ad hoc which again appear to be fighting shy of handling the macro capabilities that form part of a great power status that seems to come so naturally in view of India's stature and size. Accordingly, the vision for evolving such capabilities has not only remained confined virtually to to dealing with Pakistan, it may soon lose credibility vis-a-vis Islamabad as well. The need of the hour is that policy-makers in New Delhi perhaps should focus a little more on the larger strategic picture and try to evolve capabilities that are directed towards deterring not only Pakistan but also other countries like China which have been the actual supplier of all these missiles that frequently keep appearing in Pakistan.

Contrary to the popular belief, it is not the United States but the Chinese who have been the main supplier of Pakistan's defence technologies. And this is especially true in case of Pakistan's nuclear and missiles technologies. However, following China's signing of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1991 and declaring adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) it has become increasingly difficult for Beijing to continue with its missile exports especially to a non-NPT signatory like Pakistan. Nevertheless, reports like the Chinese supply of 5,000 ring magnets and building a missiles factory near Islamabad have also continued to come. But operating at a far more subtle level, it is in this difficult context that, Islamabad has devised this unique new strategy of announcing their new acquisitions of Chinese missiles as their own indigenous missiles development and announcements about these successive breakthroughs have kept coming in at regular intervals.

It is in the same logic of Sino-Pak technology transfers that one has to analyse series of media reports that have been appearing since early January this year (1998) in both Pakistan and India where Islamabad was expected to unveil its first intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), Ghauri, on their Pakistan Day, March 23rd. The day has passed creating further confusion in the sense that Pakistani authorities instead of either refuting these speculations or declining from making any comments have declared having postoponed the public display of Ghauri saying that some more tests shall have to be conducted before it is formally declared operational missile, thus making all these reports sound credible (read threatening). However, earlier as well, Pakistan had used its annual day parades as a major occasion to display its Hatf-I and Hatf-II short range missiles both of which have also been alleged to belong to the well known Chinese sub-categories. At its face value, therefore, these announcements, parlty sounds like the well known story-line of Chinese missiles making appearance with Pakistani names and colours. And as per speculations these reports seem to have delayed the transfer this time. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the Chinese will actually go to the extent of supplying Pakistan with an IRBM capability, which can clearly destablise the South Asian security equations.

Many defence experts, in fact, have described these reports as intentional, as part of Pakistan's continued "psychological warfare" vis-a-vis New Delhi. This appears particularly possibly considering its timings which was around the recent parliamentary elections. At such an occasion these reports could sure lead to lot of public rhetoric yet the leadership was not be in position to take any decision for any long-term counter strategy. Skeptics have also tried to undermine these reports by saying that there is nothing new about Pakistan acquiring one more Chinese missiles. According to them, except for the fact that each time China has been supplying Pakistan with a far more potent technology, this is something which has come to be the established practice since the late 1980s. However, it is this incessant growing edge in the level China's missile supplies that makes it so much threatening. And considering the fact that China's itself has lately inducted many frontier defence technologies some of the spin-off is very likely to be passed on to Islamabad. Moreover, what makes difference this time the Pakistan actually seems to leave India behind which has still to decide to operationalise it IRBM, Agni.

This historical backdrop should also make it easier to discern the appoximate technical profile of Pakistan's first IRBM as also to fathom its strategic implications for India's long-term security. Firstly, looking at its declared range, which is between 1,500-2,000 km, Ghauri seems to be some version of China's newly developed CSS-5 which is the upgraded version of China's earlier CSS-2 missile which has a range between 2,700-3,000 kms and which the Chinese had supplied to South Arabia during 1988. According to the American National Air Intelligence Centre (NAIC), the CSS-5 is an upgraded, solid-fuel as well as a mobile missile which is expected to be far more accurate at its reduced range of about of 1,350 kms. But, at the same time, this makes it possible that it is not Beijing but Ryadh that might have shared its available IRBM technologies with Islamabad which also appears possible keeping in mind the history of and literature on the Islamic bomb logic. Also there are speculations that Pakistan might have obtained these IRBM missile or technologies from North Koreans who have made considerable success in their Nodong missile. Keeping in mind North Korea's recent success in making use of its nuclear bargaining vis-a-vis the United States as also its current economic chaos it appears possible they could have also sold missile technologies for money. The South Korean press had reported on how Pyongyang has been working on two new missiles called Rodong-1 (with an estimated range of 1,000 kms) and the Taepodong-1 (with a range of 1,500 kms) both of which appear very near to Ghauri of Pakistan. North Korea is also believed to having exported 370 Scud missiles to Middle East nations since the late 1980s. Surely, its formal display in March this year should through some more light on all these speculations about Ghauri's profile.

Considering that Pakistan has actually obtained an IRBM capability, it is perhaps important that New Delhi should start examining its security implications for this country. As regards Ghauri's operational capabilities, when deployed along India's borders, it will be able to strike targets at almost whole of the Indian subcontinent except for perhaps some remote pockets of India's northeastern region. To the least, this will tremendously boost the morale Pakistan's armed forces as Ghauri will finally nullify India's traditional advantage of having the "strategic depth" whereas the whole of Pakistani territory lay exposed to India's short range missiles. Besides, the missiles is said to be capable of carrying any kind of warhead - nuclear, chemical or biological - which will make it extremely difficult to accurately define its payload thus causing further uncertainty and fear in the minds of potential adversaries. Worst of all, despite this new dangerous factor upsetting India's traditional security paradigms this announcement has not received any backlash from either the proponents of various missile technology control regimes or the neighbouring countries. The reason partly lies in the fact that this is not the first induction of an IRBM in India's neighbourhood. Apart from being the second example following China's supply of its CSS-2 to Saudi Arabia this also has a range which is much shorter than the first one. And that might leave New Delhi fairly own its own in dealing with this new intermediate range missile of Pakistan which has a direct bearing on India's security.

As regards India's neighbourhood, there is no doubt that for long this region remains infested with missiles of various kinds. Among others, India has been in the operational reach of hundreds of other IRBMs of Russia, China, Saudi Arabia and possibly Syria, Iran and North Korea for a very long time. Besides, there are large number of other countries which have obtained variety of short range missiles. What is particularly so threatening is that there is far less inhibition about their use and missiles have been many times fired during Asia's earlier inter-state wars. In 1991, use of modified and low-technology Scuds by Iraq against Israel still remains very vivid and they had created tremendous panic despite the fact that the United States had deployed world best anti ballistic missiles systems, the Patriot, to counter these Iraqi short-range missiles. Moreover, the fact that, unlike these countries, Pakistan presents a totally different case, also has to be considered. Both nuclear and missile programme of Pakistan have been singularly directed against New Delhi and this makes Pakistan's possession of this IRBM so much more threatening for India's security.

Going by the records, Pakistan's missile programme had all started in late 1980s, the following three factors of (a) the easy availability of Chinese missiles and missile technologies; (b) its inability to obtain the delivery of all its F-16 fighters from US; and (c) success of India's Integrated Precision Guided Missile Development (IPGMD) programme proved to be the main reasons providing boost to Pakistan's missile acquisitions. But while India successfully completed its IPGMD programme and closed it in August 1996, the Chinese, however, continued to assist Islamabad with necessary blueprints, components, materials and even training and actually building a missile factory to enable them to assemble their own missiles.

What is particularly intriguing is that despite Beijing's improved relations with New Delhi as also its more recent commitments to various non-proliferation regimes and the related increased pressures from Washington, there is no lack of evidence that the Sino-Pak nexus continues to flourish. Such evidences had begun to come right from its inception on April 25, 1988 when Pakistan had announced that it had tested two types of ballistic missiles named Hatf-I and Hatf-II with each being capable of hitting targets respectively at 70 and 280 kms. Considering that the Pakistanis had a very limited technological base, there were soon reports of Chinese or the French involvement. This mystery was resolved on May 18, 1989 by the then CIA Director, William Webster, told the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that he had evidence to prove that China was providing assistance to Pakistan's missile programme. But this, of course, did not deter the Chinese and, more recently, Pakistan has also obtained China's latest M-9 and M-11 missiles.

In fact, some of these announcement from Pakistan, therefore, seem only the cover-up for their Chinese missiles which can not be legally imported under the new technology control regimes by which the Chinese leaders continues to swear. Only a few months ago, in July 1997, Pakistan had similarly announced having successfully tested a 700 km range missile. This was said to have been the M-9 which has a similar range of 600 kms and is carried on a Transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle. Similarly, starting from the early 1991, the US intelligence agencies have reported having spotted M-11 launchers or dummies in Pakistan. This was said to have been the missile which Pakistan describes as their Hatf-II programme. In the same vein, there is strong possibility of Ghauri being once again another Chinese CSS-5 missile. It is, therefore, not Pakistan alone but its nexus with the Chinese which needs to be carefully studies and addressed.

Therefore, though case of Pakistan sure makes threat of their use against India much more imminent and visible, yet these missiles involve the larger question of Chinese missile exports which today infest most of the Indian neighbourhood. Secondly, missiles are also one of the most deadly weapons as there is no credible defence against missiles. This is so because unlike nuclear weapons missiles have also become increasingly acceptable worldwide as weapons of actual use especially when armed with conventional warheads and do not involve the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). According to various studies, something like 20 to 25 thousand big and small conventional armed missiles have been fired since the end of the World War II. And while so much attention is being given to WMD, far greater destruction have actually been done by these medium and short-range missiles. And it is here, this acquisition of Ghauri definitely marks a dangerous new trend legitimising China's commercial export of intermediate missiles.

During the whole decade of 1990s, Pakistan has been repeatedly throwing such surprises on India's strategic planners. But the political leadership in New Delhi, however, has been continuously embroiled in political uncertainty and any appropriate response has been circumscribed by apathy and inactivity thus leaving country's security ever more vulnerable. Even the available technology has not be brought into use and defence allocations have continued to show decline now for last eleven years. What is to be seen, therefore, is whether this time, Ghauri succeeds in forcing the Indian leadership into taking any bold initiatives. Given its range, Ghauri clearly can not be compared to India's Prithvi which has a range of between 150-250 km. Though this range suffices in dealing with Pakistan where even the farthest targets still lies within its reach yet, it is only by deterring the Chinese that India can put a stop to this continued blackmail where Pakistan perhaps does not play more than a pawn. Inducting Agni, therefore, is the only way in which India can hope to build deterrence vis-a-vis China. And this is what has to be objective in the future.
* Dr. Swaran Singh is a Research Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (New Delhi) where he specialises on China's defence and foreign affairs.